The Cocaine Impaired Lawyer by O\u27Keefe, Raymond P.
Volume 92 
Issue 3 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 92, 
1987-1988 
3-1-1988 
The Cocaine Impaired Lawyer 
Raymond P. O'Keefe 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
Raymond P. O'Keefe, The Cocaine Impaired Lawyer, 92 DICK. L. REV. 615 (1988). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol92/iss3/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
The Cocaine Impaired Lawyer
Commentary by Raymond P. O'Keefe*
I. Introduction
Society has a new epidemic, cocaine addiction, from which at-
torneys are not immune.1 Although the solution escapes precise defi-
nition at the present time, the bar should recognize and understand
the problem and develop procedures to deal effectively with this
epidemic.
The problems of addiction start with the difficulty of defining
and quantifying it. The words addiction and alcoholism are often
used interchangeably when addressing chemical dependency. For
purposes of this article, an acceptable definition of alcoholism and
other addictions may be stated as follows:
The alcoholic [addict] suffers from a disease that progresses
through a number of stages. It has biological, cultural and psy-
chological elements. Its symptoms may include increased toler-
ance for alcohol [drugs], physical dependence on it, impaired
judgment, blackouts (period in which the alcoholic [addict] is
conscious but cannot later remember), and an inability to pre-
dict how one will act on any given occasion . . . most alcoholics
[addicts] go through withdrawal when they abruptly stop .... I
Because addiction is a disease which is typified by its progres-
sion and nurtured denial, the persons most closely involved are fre-
quently the last to admit or recognize that a problem exists.8 For this
reason, studies of the full magnitude of the problem are based only
* Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law; Vice Chairman of The
American Bar Association Committee on Alcohol and Drug Law Reform; member of the
American Bar Association Advisory Commission on Youth, Alcohol and Drug Problems;
Member of The Florida Bar Committee on Attorney Alcoholism; Founding Chairman of the
New York State Bar Association Committee on Lawyer Alcoholism and Drug Abuse.
The author acknowledges his debt to Victoria Lieva A.B., J.D. for her research done in
connection with this paper.
1. See, e.g., The Mystery of a Star's Death, NEWSWEEK, June 30, 1986, at 29; Cocaine
a "Loaded Gun", NEWSWEEK, July 7, 1986, at 26; A Killer Stalks the Locker Room, U.S.
NEws AND WORLD REPORT, July 14, 1986, at 6; Keteyians & Selcraig, A Killer Strikes
Again, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 7, 1986, at 18; Cocaine Linked to Noted Lawyer's Death,
Miami Herald, June 27, 1986, at CI, col. _.
2. See, e.g., L. BISSELL & P. HABERMAN, ALCOHOLISM IN THE PROFESSIONS, 40 (1984).
3. J. CALIFANO, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK ON DRuo ABUSE AND AL-
COHOLIsM 48 (1982) [hereinafter CALIFANO REPORT].
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on estimates. We can now speak of the "disease of addiction," but
this understanding has been available only for a short period of time.
Because of the recognition of addiction as a disease by the
American Medical Association, the works of many medical educa-
tors, 4 and the driving force of Alcoholics Anonymous, the disease
concept received the acknowledgement of the professions in the
1950s and 1960s. By 1976, this widespread recognition caused the
California Bar Association to take a bold step by establishing a pro-
gram to aid attorneys and judges with alcohol abuse problems.
Medical problems associated with addiction result in difficulties
for all professions, and for the legal profession in particular. It is
difficult to assess the amount of harm caused by lawyers who suffer
from addiction; however, there is no doubt of its significance.' Yet,
intervention is possible at any point in the progression of the disease,
and treatment leading to rehabilitation is available.
The changes in alcoholism treatment came about as the result
of other drugs becoming a great social issue. Initially, addiction to
drugs other than alcohol was treated by including it in alcohol treat-
ment programs since almost sixty percent of alcoholics are also ad-
dicted to other depressants, such as mild sedatives and sleeping
pills.6 The emergence of narcotics as recreational drugs enhanced the
need to include drug abuse in these existing alcohol treatment
programs.7
Cocaine abuse represents an additional problem for the profes-
sions since all private use is criminal; the mere possession of cocaine
is a felony. 8 As it relates to the legal profession, conviction mandates
disciplinary action for violation of the rules of professional responsi-
bility.' The ethical standards provide that attorneys not "engage in
illegal conduct involving moral turpitude."10 Highlighting the seri-
ousness of such an offense is the American Bar Association footnote
to the rule which states:
The most obvious non-professional ground for disbarment is
conviction of a felony. Most states make conviction for a felony
4. BISSELL & HABERMAN, supra note 2, at 22.
5. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERvs., TARGET: ALCOHOL ABUSE IN THE HARD TO
REACH WORK FORCE 210 (1982).
6. Oims, The Disease Concept of Alcoholism, 2 ALCOHOLISM CLINICAL AND EXPERI-
MENTAL RES. 7 (July 1978).
7. Washton, Cocaine Abuse Overview: Testimony Before the Select Committee on Nar-
cotics, GRASSROOTS, DEVELOPMENT 32 (July 1985).
8. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.13 (West 1976 & 1987 Supp.).
9. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 1-102(A) (1985).
10. Id. at DR 1-102(A)(3).
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grounds for automatic disbarment. Some of these states ...
make disbarment mandatory, upon conviction for any felony,
while others require disbarment only for those felonies which in-
volve moral turpitude."11
Standard 9 of the ABA Standards For Lawyer Discipline and
Disability Proceedings provides for disciplinary proceedings in the
case of conviction of a serious crime." This standard also provides
that "upon receipt of a proposed order for interim suspension predi-
cated upon the conviction of a lawyer for a 'serious crime,' the court
should immediately and regardless of the pendency of any appeal,
place the lawyer on interim suspension."1
The once accepted concept of allowing the alcoholic to "hit bot-
tom" will not assist the cocaine addicted attorney whose "bottom" is
not reached until he is convicted of a crime. For the cocaine addicted
attorney, intervention becomes essential in treating the disease. In-
tervention is a method of interrupting the symptoms of alcoholism or
drug addiction by using the consequences of the disease progression,
information, and counselling as motivational devices to facilitate en-
try into diagnosis and treatment. 14 Intervention is usually accom-
plished by confrontation. Consequently it poses significant questions
concerning confidentiality and the individual's right to privacy.
Ideally, judgmental evaluation of the addicted attorney should
be rendered concurrently with medical treatment. Arguably, the de-
gree of criminality is less in the case of the addicted attorney who
drinks or uses drugs to satisfy a compulsion over which he or she is
powerless, as compared to a person who drinks or uses drugs for rec-
reation, or deals in them for profit. Although the addict, recreational
or social user, and dealer may commit the same offense - "posses-
sion" - the criminality of each offense surely is different and should
merit individual consideration in each of the three circumstances.
Addicts, including addicted attorneys, should be granted the oppor-
tunity for treatment with conviction and punishment to be predi-
cated upon the result of treatment. The criminality of the problem,
while it cannot be overlooked, should be considered in a more hu-
mane manner if we are to serve the profession and save a valuable
11. Id. at DR 1-102(A)(3), n.13 (1985).
12. ABA STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS, Stan-
dard 9 (1983).
13. Id. at Standard 9.2.
14. See ABA, Working Papers on Alcoholism and Intervention and the Right to Pri-
vacy Conference (March 1983).
92 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SPRING 1988
human resource.
II. Historical Perspective
The use of cocaine dates back to the time of the Incas who con-
sidered the plant a divine gift from the gods.' 5 Sigmund Freud wrote
his findings and recommendations on the use of cocaine for medical
and psychological purposes. 6 Freud and his contemporaries found
that the new drug was a powerful stimulant with valuable use as a
topical anesthetic. 17 During the years that followed, cocaine ap-
peared in several different forms, including flaked crystals, tablets,
ointments, and solutions for injections. Traces of the substance were
even included in the original formula for Coca-Cola until 1903.18
By the turn of the century, however, psychological deterioration,
demoralization, and violence were being associated with the use of
the drug.'9 Initial attempts to legislate began with the Federal Pure
Food and Drug Act of 1906.20 Subsequently, the Harrison Act of
191421 extended controls by requiring registration of handlers and
the report of all transfers. Although these applied limitations
brought about a temporary decline of usage, by the 1970s cocaine
emerged as a widespread recreational drug. 22 In 1970, the Compre-
hensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act23 introduced the
scheduled system 24 in use today. The extent of control imposed by
this system is based on the potential for abuse, recognized medical
use, and the extent of user dependency on the particular drug.
The cocaine using attorney of the 1980s is similar to the alco-
holic attorney of the prohibition era. In both cases the addiction is
criminal.
15. C. Dye, Cocaine Papers: From Freud to Freebase, Do IT Now FOUNDATION No.
102 (Oct. 1981).
16. Bosch & School, Cocaine - Review of Current Literature & Interface with the
Law, 3 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 283, 287 (Summer 1985).
17. Dye, supra note 14, at 1.
18. R. Siegel, Changing Patterns of Cocaine Use: Longitudinal Observations, Conse-
quences and Treatment, GRASSROOTS DEVELOPMENT (reprinted from NIDA Research Mono-
graph, No. 50, DHHS Publication No. (ADM) 84-1326).
19. Id. at 10.
20. Federal Pure Food and Drug Act, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906).
21. Harrison Act, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785 (1914).
22. Dye, supra note 14, at 1.
23. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970).
24. See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 811-812 (West 1981).
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A. Alcoholic Attorneys
In the 1920s, alcoholic attorneys were labeled as weakwilled,
eccentric, or ill-mannered. Their behavior went unchecked. Fellow
professionals became "enablers" by covering-up inappropriate behav-
ior. Professional organizations offered little or no help for these indi-
viduals. Unfortunately, the bar associations ignored the problem un-
til ethical violations occurred. By that time, there were no options
other than suspension or disbarment.
In 1922, the Supreme Court of Oregon held that an attorney
who was convicted of the possession and sale of an intoxicating li-
quor had committed a crime involving moral turpitude.25 The court
ordered disbarment, which was required since the attorney's crime
involved moral turpitude. In Mays v. Mason,26 moral turpitude was
defined as "an act of baseness, vileness, and depravity in the private
or social duties which a man owes to his fellowman, or to society in
general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and
duty between man and man."
By 1927, courts seemed to be less stringent in dealing with
moral turpitude in cases involving the possession and sale of intoxi-
cating liquor. For example, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that an attorney's storage of 700 quarts of beer in his house for per-
sonal consumption did not involve moral turpitude. 17 The court also
noted that it had "no regulatory power over the private life of mem-
bers of the Bar, and cannot exclude them from practice for acts in
that capacity unless they be such as to clearly demonstrate their un-
fitness to longer enjoy the privileges of the profession."2 In the same
year, an Alabama court held that distilling liquor was not a crime
involving moral turpitude.29
The prohibition laws mandated by the eighteenth amendment
were repealed by the twenty-first amendment.30 The professional or-
ganizations and the courts reacted, but not by changing the degree
of the punishment. Instead, they held that the attorneys found guilty
of intoxication or other crimes involving drunkenness were to be
judged by a lower standard. The new standard became "conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law."'" Even though the
25. State ex rel. Young v. Edmunson, 103 Or. 243, 204 P. 619, 620-21 (1922).
26. State ex. rel. Mayes v. Mason, - Or.... -, 43 P. 651, 652 (1896).
27. Bartes v. United States District Court, 19 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1927).
28. Id. at 727.
29. Bough v. State, 215 Ala. 619, 112 So. 157 (1927).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
31. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 9, at 7.
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wording of the decisions seemed more liberal and reflective of social
change, the outcome for most addicted attorneys remained severe. In
Georgia, the court found an attorney in violation of the standards
because he appeared drunk in public and suffered repeated arrests. a2
This, the court noted, was behavior clearly unbecoming of the pro-
fession. An attorney who drank with people of "low morals and
criminal disposition" was found guilty of violating the rules of ethics,
even when he argued that drinking was a necessary adjunct to his
practice of law.3 3 Habitual intoxication resulting in neglect of profes-
sional services, together with similar charges, usually resulted in per-
manent disbarment.3
This attitude on the part of professional organizations and the
courts continued until the 1960s. In Lanahan,3 5 alcohol use that re-
sulted in client neglect was viewed as bringing disrepute to the pro-
fession as a whole. This in turn, prompted findings that the attorney
was unfit to be a member of the bar. However, three years later the
same attorney was reinstated to membership in the bar upon a show-
ing of clear and convincing evidence of rehabilitation."' This 1967
decision reflected a new attitude, at least with respect to alcoholic
attorneys, that addiction was a treatable disease and that the attor-
ney's rehabilitation and payment of restitution, when appropriate,
could be considered a mitigating circumstance.37
B. The Vice of the 1980s - Cocaine
In the 1980s, cocaine became the attorney's alternative to alco-
hol, the new recreational drug of choice. Cocaine is administered in
its most common form by inhalation through the intranasal mucous
membranes. This results in a twenty to forty minute stimulation or
"high."' 8 The effects of cocaine on the central nervous system are
evidenced by any combination of the following: dilation of the pupils;
increased pulse rate, blood pressure, temperature, and blood sugar
level; slowdown of the digestive process; hypothalmic stimulation; eu-
32. Wood v. State ex rel. Boykin, 45 Ga. App. 783, 165 S.E. 908 (1932).
33. E.g., In re Osmond, 174 Okla. 561, 54 P.2d 319 (1935).
34. E.g. In re Hermann, 165 Or. 59, 105 P.2d 512 (1940).
35. In re Lanahan, 95 Ariz. 268, 389 P.2d 263 (1964).
36. Application of Lanahan, 102 Ariz. 191, 427 P.2d 142 (1967).
37. See, e.g., Matter of Schunk, 126 A.D.2d 772, 510 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1987); Tenner v.
State Bar, 28 Cal.3d 202, 617 P.2d 486, 168 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1980); In re Driscoll, 85 111.2d,
423 N.E.2d 873, 53 I1. Dec. 204 (1981); Attorney Grievance Com'n. of Md. v. Dunphy, 297
Md. 377, 467 A.2d 177 (1983); Petition of Johnson, 322 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1982).
38. M. Fischman, The Behavioral Pharmacology of Cocaine in Humans, GRASSROOTS
DEVELOPMENT 28 (1984) reprint from NIDA Research Monograph No. 50 DHHS Publica-
tion No. 84-1326.
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phoria; fever; and potentially fatal seizures.39 Since 1982, cocaine
addiction in the United States has almost doubled; the death rate is
expected to increase similarly.'"
A major myth once associated with cocaine was that the drug
was not addictive and could be used safely as a recreational drug.
This erroneous belief was based on the absence of an immediate
physical withdrawal syndrome normally associated with abuse of al-
cohol or drugs."1 The myth has been shattered; the addictive power
of cocaine has now been scientifically proven by findings of chemical
alterations in the brains of the users.' 2
Cocaine addiction manifests itself by loss of control, compulsion
to use, and continued use regardless of the consequences. 43 Upon ces-
sation of usage, the high dose addict experiences severe depression
accompanied by various other symptoms including incoherence for a
period of approximately three to five days." The physical depen-
dency, which is usually defined by tolerance to a drug or the pres-
ence of withdrawal syndrome upon cessation, is therefore quite ap-
parent in cocaine addicts.' 5
In 1986, a new form of cocaine appeared on the streets. Known
as "crack" or "rock,' 46 this new form releases the user from the bur-
den and risk of preparing his own drug for freebasing 47 and produces
an even more euphoric and addictive "high."' '8 This tremendous
"high" is brief and is followed by an overwhelming depression that
creates a need in the user for more cocaine. It is this "see-saw" ef-
fect that creates the compulsion to continue use. Crack is a concen-
trated form of cocaine resulting from a change in the processing.
Ether, the dangerous solvent used in freebasing, is no longer neces-
sary. 49 To manufacture crack, cocaine that is about seventy-five per-
39. Survey Findings from 800-Cocaine, GRASSROOTS DEVELOPMENT 13 (July 1984).
40. Washton, supra note 7, at 29.
41. Id. Adding to the myth was the dispute in the medical world over the labeling of
cocaine as a Schedule 11 narcotic. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.03(2) (West 1976 & 1987 Supp.).
Discrepancy has existed since the grouping of cocaine with opiates and derivatives seems to
many a misplacement of the drug. E.g., Siegel, supra note 17, at 11. See also Commonwealth
v. Miller, 366 Mass. 387, 318 N.E.2d 909 (1974).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 30.
45. Id. at 29.
46. Id. at 30-31.
47. "Freebasing" is the "conversion of sniffable cocaine crystals into a smokable 'base'
form of the drug." Kids and Cocaine, NEWSWEEK, March 17, 1986, at 58.
48. Crack: A Cheap and Deadly Cocaine is a Spreading Menace, TIME, June 2, 1986, at
16 [hereinafter Crack].
49. Id. at 17.
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cent pure is mixed with simple household items like baking soda or
flour to create a thick paste which results in a crystalline that is
shaped into tablet or pellet ("rock") form. 50 This new product is eas-
ily concealed and is usually sold for $10 to $15 per dose.5"
The medical effects of crack differ from those of other snorted
cocaines. One doctor has stated that "crack throws the entire cardio-
vascular system into turmoil. Your blood vessels rapidly constrict.
You're a key candidate for respiratory failure. ' 52 Additionally, coro-
nary attacks may result from increased blood pressure and heart
rate, and the "intense stimulation of the brain may trigger
convulsions." 53
The compulsive use of crack brings into sharp focus the severe
addictive capabilities of cocaine."" Recreational use of cocaine can
result in addiction within two to five years of the first use.55 Even
more alarming are recent statistics from the crack epidemic in New
York and Los Angeles which show that addiction to this variation of
cocaine will occur in several weeks or after a few dosages.56 The
extent of cocaine use, recorded by a national service,57 demonstrates
the addictive life threatening characteristics. Sudden death among




53. Id. Death caused by cocaine often takes the appearance of a myocardial infraction
or pulmonary misfunction, and therefore such deaths are often not properly recorded. The
toxic side effects of cocaine are apparent, but their full extent remains unknown.
54. Addiction was labeled as the number one health problem in the United States by
Joseph Califano, Former Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. Mr. Califano has re-
ferred to addiction as "our most wanted criminal." See CALIFANO REPORT, supra note 3, at
88.
55. E.g., Crack, supra note 48, at 58.
56. Id.
57. The following data is based on random samples of 500 callers to a national "1-800-
COCAINE" telephone hotline. The surveys were completed during three-month periods in
1983 and 1985.
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even to the healthy and the young.8 8 Even first time use, as in the
case of a healthy thirty-four year old Miami attorney, can prove
fatal.59
III. The Cocaine Impaired Attorney
Legal problems occur at an anticlimactic point when the attor-
ney-users must face up to their addiction. If they are fortunate, the
legal system will order them to seek help. The sad reality is that
often this occurs only after conviction. In the case of attorneys, this
point in the progression of the disease comes too late to offer a
solution.
When dealing with the cocaine impaired attorney, the first step
should be consideration of the purpose of professional discipline:
The purpose of lawyer discipline and liability proceedings is













Average age 30 yr 27 yr
Adolescents (age and under) I % 7%
Yearly income:
$10-425,000 60% 73%
over $25,000 40% 27%
Cocaine Use:





Use of Other Drugs to alleviate
unpleasant effects of cocaine: 68% 87%
Auto Accident on Cocaine: 11% 19%
Use of Cocaine at Work: 42% 74%
58. Ford, Drugs, Athletes and the NCAA: A Proposed Rule for Mandatory Drug Test-
ing in College Athletics, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 205 (1984).
59. Cocaine a "Loaded Gun," NEWSWEEK, July 7, 1986, at 26.
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der to protect the public and the administration of justice from
lawyers who have demonstrated by their conduct that they are
unable ...to properly discharge their professional duties.6"
The process of bringing a lawyer to discipline is said to be nonadver-
sarial; however, this perspective seems to have been forgotten at
times. The original purpose of these proceedings has been, to some
degree, reinstated by decisions allowing evidence of the disease of
alcoholism, addiction, or other chemical dependency, together with
evidence of restitution and rehabilitation, to serve as mitigating
factors. 1
Proceedings for disciplinary violations, as in all other proceed-
ings, depend on the application of the particular circumstances of
each individual case. 2 In Florida Bar v. Murell," the court formu-
lated a test to determine the reasonableness of the discipline ordered
in relation to the offense and held that discipline imposed must be 1)
fair to the attorney; 2) just to the public; 3) designed to correct anti-
social tendencies on the part of the attorney; and 4) severe enough to
deter similar conduct by other members of the bar. Through its own
flexibility this workable standard produced a balanced decision.
In 1981, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that alcoholism
would be considered a mitigating factor in the disciplinary process.
In reference to the alcoholic attorney, the court said: "Alcoholics
need not be treated just like other people; our duty to uphold the
standards and reputation of the profession is not incompatible with
sympathy and leniency for victims of alcoholism. But their tragedy
cannot be used as a license to exploit clients .. ."I" This decision
led to the enactment in 1982 of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 772
that established probation as a sanction for professional miscon-
duct.65 In addition, other states have held that addiction is a relevant
mitigating factor and have concluded that probation is an effective
remedy.66 Conviction of crimes involving moral turpitude rightly re-
60. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 9, at 309.
61. See, e.g., Disciplinary Bd. of Hawaii Supreme Ct. v. Bergan, 60 Haw. 546, 592 P.2d
814 (1979); Matter of Corbett, 87 A.D.2d 140, 450 N.Y.S.2d 802 (1982).
62. Florida Bar v. Wilson, 425 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 1983).
63. Florida Bar v. Murell, 74 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1954).
64. In re Driscoll, 85 1ll.2d 312, - , 423 N.E.2d 873, 874-75, 53 11. Dec. 201,
(1981).
65. Carroll & Feldman, Supreme Court Rule 772: Support for the Impaired Attorney,
73 ILL. B.J. 14 (Sept. 1984).
66. See, e.g., Matter of Corbett, 87 A.D.2d 140, 450 N.Y.S.2d 802 (1982); In re Cohen,
11 Cal. 3d 416, 521 P.2d 477, 113 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1974); see also Annotation, Mental or
Emotional Disturbance as a Defense to or in Mitigation of Charges Against Attorney in Dis-
ciplinary Proceeding, 26 A.L.R. 4th 995 (1983).
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suits in disbarment as a general rule, but this sanction should be
used only in cases when the evidence shows that the addicted attor-
ney acted for the purpose of self-enrichment. 7
Addiction creates such a compulsion to use that ultimately
every aspect of the user's life is destroyed. Accepted as part of the
circumstances that surround the abuse of cocaine is the fact that by
the time the abuser reaches a $500-a-week habit he or she usually
begins to sell cocaine in order to maintain the addiction.6" The resul-
tant financial burden places the impaired attorney in a situation in
which he often invades trust accounts." Some attorneys obtain loans
which are not repaid or write checks against insufficient funds.70 In
other situations, the addicted attorney is unable to function as coun-
sel71 or fails to carry out the stipulations of an employment con-
tract.7 In one case, an impaired attorney even made false accusa-
tions against state supreme court justices.78
As indicated, some courts now consider addiction and rehabili-
tation as mitigating factors in disciplinary actions.7' Applying the
Murell standard 75 to cases of violations of professional responsibility
involving moral turpitude, many courts have avoided the severity of
disbarment and instead ordered suspension or probation with special
conditions, most notably among them, rehabilitation. 76 This proce-
dure is the established practice of Florida.7 The Florida Supreme
Court has stated:
Normally, the referee would recommend disbarment. How-
ever, the record reveals that the downfall of the respondent was
due to his not enjoying the practice of law plus his becoming
addicted to alcohol. The combination of these two factors led to
gross neglect of his clients' affairs . . . [he] has joined Al-
coholics Anonymous and is trying to straighten himself out and
to make restitution. He has hit bottom. The referee believes he
67. E.g., Muniz v. State, 575 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
68. Cocaine Use and Abuse in the U.S.: A Brief Overview of Some Facts, GRASSROOTS
DEVELOPMENT, Nov. 1984, at 18.
69. E.g., Florida Bar v. Blalock, 325 So.2d 401 (1976); In re Webb, 37 S.D. 509, 159
N.W. 107 (1916); In re Manahan, - Minn. - , 242 N.W. 548 (1932).
70. E.g., In re Bialick, 298 Minn. 376, 215 N.W.2d 613 (1974).
71. E.g., In re Chmelik, 203 Minn. 156, 280 N.W. 283 (1938).
72. E.g., In re Vincent, - Ind. - , 374 N.E.2d 40 (1978).
73. State ex rel. Dabney v. Ledbetter, 127 Okla. 85, 260 P. 454 (1927).
74. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., In re Cohen, 11 Cal. 3d 935, 523 P.2d 651, 114 Cal. Rptr. 611 (1974);
Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct of Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. Rabe, 284 N.W.2d
234 (Iowa 1979).
77. E.g., State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Black, 150 So. 2d 724 (1963).
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merits a chance to redeem himself.78
As a result of decisions such as Florida Bar v. Ullensvang, an
attorney charged with twenty-six counts of neglect was not disbarred
but was permitted to seek treatment and return to the practice of
law after a three-year suspension. 9 In other cases, ethical violations
resulting from the effects of alcohol have resulted in suspension with
special conditions of rehabilitation or disbarment with provisions for
reapplication."
Rehabilitation from cocaine usage and addiction is available in
most cases through the same treatment approach used successfully in
the treatment of alcohol addiction. Three basic tenets underlie all of
the specific techniques or therapeutic practices employed in the
treatment: 1) addiction is a disease which has its basis in genetic,
physical, social, and emotional factors; 2) with appropriate treatment
recovery is not only possible but quite probable; and 3) while people
may not be responsible for their addiction, they are responsible for
their recovery.8 1 This process, with the help of support groups and
long-term follow-up such as Alcoholics Anonymous or, more re-
cently, Cocaine Anonymous, offers the best chance for arresting this
disease.
Recently, possession of controlled substances has been held to
be a crime not involving moral turpitude."' Evidently, the recent
years of positive experience in dealing with alcohol impaired attor-
neys have aided the courts and professional organizations in dealing
with cocaine abuse. The 1986 case of Florida Bar v. Rosen8 is in-
structive on this point. Howard Rosen was convicted of two counts of
possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. The Florida Supreme
Court, in reviewing the referee's recommendation, noted that "Rosen
illustrated yet another tragedy related to cocaine abuse."84 The court
found that Rosen had not only been a valuable member of the bar
prior to his disease, but after conviction had sought medical help. In
view of the mitigating circumstances, the court ordered three years
of suspension with demonstrated rehabilitation rather than
disbarment.
78. Florida Bar v. Ullensvang, 400 So. 2d 969, 182 (Fla. 1981).
79. FLORIDA PRACTICE RULE 3-7.9, cited in Florida Rules of Court 593 (West 1987).
80. Florida Bar v. Knowles, 500 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 1986).
81. See, e.g., Pearl v. Florida Bd. of Real Estate, 394 So. 2d 189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981); In re Conduct of Chase, 299 Or. 391, 702 P.2d 1082 (1985).




Rosen is a prime example of the cocaine tragedy. Mr. Rosen
was a member in good standing of the Florida Bar, magna cum
laude in his undergraduate work, and second in his graduating law
school class. A tax attorney with a successful practice, he had been
recognized by the bar for his contribution to the profession. In 1981,
Mr. Rosen began to abandon his practice as he lost control of his life
due to his addiction to cocaine. By 1982, he was trafficking in
cocaine.
The Florida Bar recommended disbarment based on the felony
convictions in federal court. The bar argued, consistent with the ethi-
cal rules, that Mr. Rosen's illegal conduct involved moral turpitude
and his behavior showed him unfit to be a member of the profession.
The hearing referee found that Mr. Rosen's involvement in the crime
for which he pleaded guilty was a result of his own addiction to co-
caine and that the addiction was the prime force behind his felony
conviction. The court decided that these statements, bolstered by
favorable witness testimony and Mr. Rosen's cooperation in the
criminal prosecutions and rehabilitation, warranted suspension
rather than disbarment. Thus, the court effectively expressed its be-
lief that Mr. Rosen would once again become an asset to the Florida
Bar.
The partial dissent in Rosen maintained that Mr. Rosen should
be tested by examination before being allowed to re-enter practice.
The dissent further suggested that such attorneys be required to re-
take and pass the Bar examination in order to reestablish their profi-
ciency. This approach reflects the Florida Rule85 requiring bar mem-
bers who have been disbarred or have resigned to wait five years
before re-applying for admission, subject to passing the bar examina-
tion. In Florida Bar v. Knowles,86 the court ordered disbarment
based upon a plea to a substantial conversion by an alcoholic attor-
ney. The court disbarred Knowles nunc pro tunc so that reapplica-
tion could be made upon successful completion of the trial court or-
dered probation. Re-examination by the bar examiners was required.
During the last fifty years, the status of drugs has fluctuated
from uncontrolled to strictly and legally controlled. As society has
reacted to these changes, so have the bar associations in disciplining
their membership. The support and assistance of attorneys who are
themselves rehabilitated alcoholics or addicts actively involved in re-
85. Supra note 79.
86. 500 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 1986).
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habilitation programs constitute the driving force in educating attor-
neys and the judiciary about the disease concept of addiction. In
fact, twenty-eight states have developed assistance programs for
their membership. These programs vary; some are bar sponsored and
controlled, while others are independent of the bar association. All of
the programs utilize recovered alcoholic or addict attorneys as indis-
pensable volunteers. The International Lawyers in Alcoholics Anony-
mous has regular meetings to confer on the problem of the addicted
attorney.
Today, the challenge is greater than ever before because of the
availability of cocaine, especially in the form of crack. As the con-
sumption of cocaine by the general public rises, it can be expected
that a similar increase will occur in the legal profession. To help the
profession, educational programs for attorneys must be developed. It
is imperative that these programs instruct attorneys on the fatal as-
pects of the drug and teach them how to identify victims. Early in-
tervention is essential to assist the drug impaired attorney. The legal
educational system should, at least, offer some information to law
students on the seriousness and extent of this problem.
IV. Conclusion
The courts and the bar associations must deal with the drug
impaired attorney in a just, but humane, way. There must be a bal-
ancing of the drug impaired attorney's duties to his clients, the pro-
fession, and the public. Moreover, the bar associations have a corre-
sponding duty to the attorney, the profession, and the public.
The courts, which are the forum in which the actual balancing
will be affected, must accept a few basic propositions as valid:
(1) Alcohol and drug addiction are treatable diseases.
(2) The attorney who commits disciplinary infractions,
which in many instances are even criminal, may be under the
influence of this disease.
(3) Effective treatment and rehabilitation programs, most
notably those in conjunction with Alcoholics Anonymous and
those which seek to adapt Alcoholics Anonymous principles, are
readily available.
Once the courts accept the foregoing axioms, they may then
consider, on a case by case basis, the addictive nature of the disease,
the amount of restitution where appropriate, and the attorney's ef-
forts at rehabilitation. Consideration of these factors in determining
punishment would probably result in a decree of interim suspension,
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probation, or disbarment without prejudice to reapplication for ad-
mission rather than an arbitrary disbarment. In this fashion, the
court fulfills its obligations to the profession and the public while
humanely balancing the rights and duties of the cocaine impaired
attorney.
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87. Compare In re Sonderen, 303 Or. 129, 734 P.2d 348 (1987) (disbarment not or-
dered) with In Re Eads, 303 Or. 11I, 734 P.2d 340 (1987) (attorney disbarred).

